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This paper compares the performance of economies with different monetary regimes during the last
quarter century. The conclusions include: (1) There is little evidence that inflation targeting affects
performance in advanced economies, but some evidence of benefits in emerging economies; (2) Europe’s
monetary union has increased intra-European trade and capital flows, but divergence in national price
levels may destabilize output in the future; (3) The “monetary analysis” of the European Central Bank
has little effect on the ECB’s policy decisions; and (4) Countries with hard currency pegs experience






lball@jhu.edu1 To keep this chapter manageable, I limit the analysis in two ways.  First, while I
examine hard exchange rate pegs – currency boards and dollarization – I otherwise deemphasize
exchange-rate policy.  I do not address the relative merits of flexible exchange rates, managed
floats, and adjustable pegs.  Frankel’s chapter in this Handbook discusses these issues.
     Second, I examine both advanced economies and emerging economies, but not the world’s
poorest countries.  Emerging economies include such countries as Brazil and the Czech
Republic; they do not include most countries in Africa.  Many of the poorest countries target
monetary aggregates, a policy that has lost favor among richer countries (see IMF [2008] for a
list of money targeters).
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I. INTRODUCTION
     The choice of monetary regime is a perennial issue in
economics.  For decades, advocates of discretionary or “just do
it” monetary policy have debated supporters of regimes that
constrain policymakers.  Such regimes range from money targeting,
advocated by Milton Friedman in the 1960s, to the inflation
targeting practiced by many countries today.
     This chapter compares monetary regimes that have been 
popular in advanced and emerging economies during the last 25
years.  I examine countries with discretionary policy, such as
the United States, and countries with inflation targets. I also
examine countries that have given up national monetary policy,
either by forming a currency union or through a hard peg to a
foreign currency.  Finally, I examine a remnant of the once-
popular policy of money targeting: the European Central Bank’s
use of “monetary analysis” in setting interest rates.
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     Other chapters in this Handbook examine the theoretical
arguments for alternative policies (e.g. Svensson on inflation
targets).  This chapter deemphasizes theory and examines the
actual economic performance of countries that have adopted
alternative regimes.  I focus on the behavior of core
macroeconomic variables: output, inflation, and interest rates.  
     Section II of this chapter examines two monetary regimes
adopted by many countries: inflation targeting (IT), and
membership in Europe’s currency union. I focus on advanced
economies and the period from 1985 to mid-2007 –- the Great
Moderation.  Simple statistical tests suggest that neither IT nor
the euro had major effects on economic performance, either good
or bad, during the sample period. An important topic for future
research is the performance of the two regimes during the recent
financial crisis.     
     Section III reviews the previous literature on inflation
targeting. Many papers confirm my finding that IT does not have
major effects in advanced economies. Some authors report
beneficial effects, but their evidence is dubious. The story is
different when we turn to emerging economies: there is
substantial evidence that IT reduces average inflation in these
economies and stabilizes inflation and output. Even for emerging
economies, however, the effects of IT are not as clear-cut as3
some authors suggest. 
     Section IV surveys research on the effects of the euro and
adds some new results.  The evidence to date suggests that the
currency union has produced a moderate increase in intra-European
trade and a larger increase in capital-market integration.  On
the downside, price levels in different countries have diverged,
causing changes in competitiveness.  This problem could
destabilize output in the future.
     Section V turns to the role of money in policymaking at the
European Central Bank.  On its face, the ECB’s reliance on a
“monetary pillar” of policy differs from the practices of most
central banks.  However, a review of history suggests that this
difference is largely an illusion.  ECB policymakers regularly
discuss the behavior of monetary aggregates, but these variables
rarely if ever influence their setting of interest rates.  
     Finally, Section VI discusses hard exchange-rate pegs,
including currency boards and dollarization.  History suggests
that these policies are associated with substantial risk of
economic downturns. In most economies with hard pegs, episodes of
capital flight have produced deep recessions.
     Section VII concludes.4
II. SOME SIMPLE EVIDENCE
     In the past quarter century, two development in monetary
policy stand out: the spread of inflation targeting and the
creation of the euro. I estimate the effects of these regime
shifts on economic performance during the period from 1985 to
mid-2007–-an era of economic stability commonly known as the
Great Moderation. I examine 20 advanced economies, including
countries that adopted inflation targeting, joined the euro, did
neither, or did both (Spain and Finland adopted IT and then
switched to the euro). I find that neither of the two regimes has
substantially changed the behavior of output, inflation, or long-
term interest rates.     
Background
     New Zealand and Canada pioneered inflation targeting in the
early 1990s.  Under this regime, the central bank’s primary goal
is to keep inflation near an announced target or within a target
range. This policy quickly gained popularity, and today
approximately 30 central banks are inflation targeters (IMF,
2008).
     In 1999, 11 European countries abolished their national
currencies and adopted the euro; 15 countries used the euro in
2009.  This currency union dwarfs all others in the world.  I
will interpret euro adoption as a choice of monetary regime:5
rather than choose discretionary policy or inflation targeting, a
country cedes control of its monetary policy to the ECB.
     I compare inflation targeting and euro membership to a group
of policy regimes that I call “traditional.”  This group includes
all regimes in advanced economies since 1985 that are not IT or
the euro. Some of these regimes, such as those of the United
States and Japan, fit the classic notion of discretion.  In
classifying policy regimes, the IMF (2008) categorizes the U.S.
and Japan as “other,” with a footnote saying they “have no
explicitly stated nominal anchor, but rather monitor various
indicators in conducting monetary policy.”  
     Other regimes in the traditional category do involve some
nominal anchor, at least in theory.  These regimes include money
targeting in Germany and Switzerland in the 1980s and 1990s. They
also include the European Monetary System (EMS) of the same era,
which featured target ranges for exchange rates. 
    In most cases, traditional monetary regimes are highly
flexible. Germany and Switzerland’s money targets were medium-run
guide-posts; policymakers had considerable discretion to adjust
policy from year to year (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992). The EMS
also gave central banks substantial latitude in setting policy. A
country could belong to the System and adopt another regime:
Germany targeted money and Spain and Finland targeted inflation.6
Exchange-rate bands were adjusted a number of times, and
countries could leave the System (the U.K. and Italy) and reenter
(Italy).  
     Economists have suggested many effects of switching from
traditional policy regimes to IT or the euro. For example,
proponents of IT argue that this policy anchors inflation
expectations, making it easier to stabilize the economy (e.g.
King, 2005). Skeptics, on the other hand, suggest that IT
stabilizes inflation at the expense of more volatile output (e.g.
Kohn, 2005). Proponents argue that IT increases the
accountability of policymakers (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999),
while skeptics argue that IT reduces accountability (Friedman,
2004).
     Many students of the euro cite both benefits and costs of
this regime (e.g. Lane, 2006, 2009). For example, a common
currency increases the integration of European economies,
promoting efficiency and growth. On the other hand, “one size
fits all” monetary policy produces sub-optimal responses to
country-specific shocks. 
Methodology
     Here I seek to measure the effects of IT and the euro in
simple ways. I focus on basic measures of economic performance:
the means and standard deviations of inflation, output, and long-7
term interest rates. The basic approach is “differences in
differences”: I compare changes in performance over time in
countries that adopted IT or the euro and countries that did not. 
An important detail is that, following Ball and Sheridan (2005),
I control for the initial level of performance. This approach
addresses the problem that changes in policy regime are
endogenous.
     Gertler (2005) and Geraats (2010) criticize the Ball-
Sheridan methodology, suggesting that it produces misleading
estimates of the effects of regime changes. Here I present the
method and discuss informally why it eliminates the bias in pure
diffs-in-diffs estimates. Appendix 1 to this chapter formally
derives conditions under which the Ball-Sheridan estimator is
unbiased.
     Ball and Sheridan examine two time periods and two policy
regimes, inflation targeting and traditional policy. In this
chapter’s empirical work, I add a third regime, the euro, and
examine three time periods. To build intuition, I first discuss 
estimation of the effects of IT in the two-period / two-regime
case, and then show how the approach generalizes.
     Two Periods and Two Regimes Let X be some measure of
economic performance, such as the average rate of inflation. Xi1
and Xi2 are the levels of X in country i and periods 1 and 2. In8
period 1, all countries have traditional monetary policy; in
period 2, some countries switch to inflation targeting. 
     At first blush, a natural way to estimate the effect of IT
on X is to run a diffs-in-diffs regression:
     (1)  Xi2 - Xi1 = a + bIi + ,i ,
where Ii is a dummy variable that equals one if country i adopted
IT in period 2. The coefficient b is the average difference in
the change in X between countries that switched to IT and
countries that did not. One might think that b captures the
effect of IT. 
     Unfortunately, the dummy variable I is likely to be
correlated with the error term ,, causing bias in the OLS
estimate of b. To see this point, suppose for concreteness that X
is average inflation. The correlation of , and I has two
underlying sources:
     (A) Dissatisfaction with inflation performance in period 1
is one reason that a country might adopt IT in period 2. That is,
a high level of Xi1 makes it more likely that Ii=1.  The data
confirm this effect: the average Xi1 is significantly higher for
IT adopters than for non-adopters.
     (B) A high level of Xi1 has a negative effect on Xi2-Xi1. This
effect reflects the basic statistical phenomenon of regression to
the mean: high values of Xi1 are partly the result of transitory9
factors, so they imply that Xi is likely to fall in period 2.
This effect exists regardless of whether a country adopts IT;
thus a high Xi1 has a negative effect on the error term ,i in
equation (1).
     To summarize, Xi1 has a positive effect on Ii and a negative
effect on ,i. As a result, variation in Xi1 induces a negative
correlation between Ii and ,i, which biases downward the OLS
estimate of b. If IT has no true effect on inflation, the
estimate of b is likely to suggest a negative effect. For more on
this point, readers who like folksy intuition should see the
analogy to baseball batting averages in Ball and Sheridan (p.
256). Readers who prefer mathematical rigor should see Appendix 1
to this chapter.
     Ball and Sheridan address the problem with equation (1) by
adding Xi1:
     (2)  Xi2 - Xi1 = a + bIi + cXi1 + ,i
In this specification, ,i is the change in Xi that is not
explained by either Ii or Xi1. Variation in Xi1 does not affect
this term, so effect (B) discussed above does not arise. Xi1
still affects Ii (effect (A)), but this no longer induces
correlation between Ii and ,i. The bias in the OLS estimate of b
disappears.
     Again, Appendix 1 expands on this argument: it derives10
conditions under which OLS produces an unbiased estimate of b in
equation (2). The intuition is that adding Xi1 to the equation
controls for regression to the mean. Now if b is significant, it 
means that adopting IT has an effect on inflation that is
unrelated to initial inflation. 
     Three Periods and Three Regimes In this chapter’s empirical
work, I compare three policy regimes: traditional policy, IT, and
the euro. I also split the data into three time periods: t = 1,
2, 3; as detailed below, this is natural given the observed
timing of regime shifts. To capture these changes, I generalize
equation (2) to 
   (3)  Xit - Xit-1 




t + cIit + dEit 









t are dummy variables for periods 2 and 3. In this
regression, there are two observations for each country. For one
observation, the dependent variable is the change in X from
period 1 to period 2; in the other, it is the change from 2 to 3.
     On the right side of equation (3), the variables of interest
are Iit and Eit, which indicate changes in regime from period t-1
to period t.  These variables are defined by
   Iit = 1 if country i switched from traditional policy in
period t-1 to IT or the euro in period t; 11
      = 0 otherwise .
   Eit = 1 if country i switched from traditional policy or IT in
period t-1 to the euro in period t;
      = 0 otherwise .
     To interpret these variables, it is helpful to look ahead to
the data. In period 1, all countries have traditional monetary
policy. In period 2, which starts in the early 1990s, some switch
to IT. In period 3, which starts in the late 1990s, additional
countries adopt IT, and some countries switch from their period-2
regime to the euro. In the entire sample, we observe three types
of regime changes: traditional to IT, IT to the euro, and
traditional to the euro.
     If country i switches from traditional policy to IT in
period t, then Iit=1 and Eit=0. The coefficient on I gives the
effect of this regime change. If a country switches from IT to
the euro, then Iit=0 and Eit=1; the coefficient on E gives the
effect. Finally, if a country switches from traditional policy to
the euro, then Iit=1 and Eit=1. Thus the effect of a traditional-
to-euro switch is the sum of the coefficients on I and E. 
     The dummy variables D2
t and D
3
t allow the constant in the
regression to differ across time periods. Similarly, the
interactions of the dummies with Xit-1 allow different regression-
to-the-mean effects. Appendix 1 discusses the interpretation of12
these differences.
The Data
     I estimate equation (3) for 20 advanced economies: all
countries with populations above one million that were members of
the OECD in 1985. This choice of countries follows Ball and
Sheridan. Table 1 lists the countries and their policy regimes in
three time periods. In the 20 countries, regime shifts occurred
in two waves: seven countries adopted IT from 1990 to 1995, and
twelve adopted either IT or the euro from 1999 to 2001. Thus the
data break naturally into three periods: before the first wave of
regime changes, between the two waves, and after the second wave. 
     The precise dating of the periods differs across countries. 
In all cases, period 1 begins in 1985:1. For countries that
adopted IT in the early 1990s, period 2 starts in the first
quarter of the new policy. For countries that did not adopt IT in
the early 90s, period 2 begins at the average start date of
adopters (1993:3).  Similarly, for countries that switched
regimes between 1999 and 2001, period 3 starts in the first
quarter of the new policy, and the start date for non-switchers
is the average for switchers (1999:2). Period 3 ends in 2007:2
for all countries.      
     I estimate equation (3) for six versions of the variable X:
the means and standard deviations of consumer price inflation,2 Table 2 reports OLS standard errors. It does not report robust standard errors that
account for heteroscedasticity or correlations between a country’s errors in periods 2 and 3. The
good properties of robust standard errors are asymptotic; with 40 observations,  OLS standard
errors may be more accurate. (The folk wisdom of applied econometricians appears to support
OLS standard errors for small samples, but I have not found a citation.) In any case, I have also
computed robust standard errors for my estimates, and they do not change my qualitative results.
13
real output growth, and nominal interest rates on long-term
government bonds.  The inflation data are from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics; output and interest rates are
from the OECD. The inflation and interest-rate data are
quarterly. The output data are annual because accurate quarterly
data are not available for all countries. (In studying output
behavior, I include a year in the time period for a regime only
if all four quarters belong to the period under my quarterly
dating.)
     Appendix 2 to this chapter provides further details about
the data. It also provides complete results of the regressions
discussed here.
Main Results 
     Table 2 summarizes the key coefficient estimates: the
coefficients on I and E for the six measures of performance. The
Table also shows the sum of the coefficients, which gives the
effect of a traditional-to-euro switch.
2
     Effects of IT: The first row of Table 2 shows the effects of
switching from traditional policy to IT. There is only one14
beneficial effect: IT reduces average inflation by -0.7
percentage points (t=2.6). To interpret this result, note that
average inflation for IT countries is 1.7% in period 2 and 2.1%
in period 3. My estimate implies that these numbers would be 2.4%
and 2.8% without IT. This effect is not negligible but not
dramatic either.
     Point estimates imply that IT raises the mean and standard
deviation of long-term nominal interest rates. The statistical
significance of these effects is borderline, however, and they do
not have a compelling theoretical explanation; to the contrary,
if IT anchors inflation expectations, it ought to stabilize long-
term interest rates at a low level. I am inclined to dismiss the
interest-rate results as flukes. In any case, there is no
evidence whatsoever that IT improves the behavior of interest
rates or output.
     Effects of the Euro: The estimated effects of euro adoption
are shown in the second and third rows of Table 2. The second row
shows effects of an IT-euro switch; the third row, a traditional-
euro switch.
     Once again, the results do not point to large benefits of a
new regime. Euro adoption can reduce average interest rates–-but
the effect has borderline significance (t=2.0) and arises only
for an IT-euro switch, not a traditional-euro switch. A priori,15
one might expect a larger effect for the second type of switch.
There is also an adverse, borderline-significant effect of a
traditional-euro switch on output volatility.
Robustness
     I have varied my estimation of equation (3) in several ways:
     C I have dropped countries from the sample to make the set
of “traditional” policy regimes more homogeneous. In one
variation, I eliminate Denmark, which fixes its exchange rate
against the euro. In another, I eliminate all countries that
belonged to the pre-1999 European Monetary System. (In this
variation I can estimate the effects of IT but not of the euro,
as only EMS members adopted the euro).
     C I have varied the dating of the three time periods, making
them the same for all countries. Specifically, periods 2 and 3 
begin on the average dates of regime switches, 1993:3 and 1999:2.
Consistency in time periods has the cost of less precise dating
of individual regime changes.  
     C Finally, I allow inflation targeting to have different
short-run and long-run effects. This could occur if it takes time
for expectations to adjust to a new regime. In equation (3), I
add a third dummy variable that equals one if a country is an16
inflation targeter in both t-1 and t. In this specification, the
coefficient on I is the immediate effect of adopting IT, and the
sum of coefficients on I and the new dummy is the effect in the
second period of targeting. 
     Appendix 2 gives the results of these robustness checks. To
summarize, the weak effects in Table 2 generally stay the same or
become even weaker. In some cases, the effect of IT on average
inflation becomes insignificant. 
Future Research: Policy Regimes and the Financial Crisis
     It is not surprising that effects of regime changes are hard
to detect for the period from 1985 to 2007. During this period –-
the Great Moderation –- central banks in advanced economies faced
few adverse shocks. As a result, they found it relatively easy to
stabilize output and inflation with or without IT or the euro. An
important topic for future work is the performance of policy
regimes during the world financial crisis that ended the Great
Moderation period.
     A starting point for future work is the different behavior
of the Federal Reserve and other central banks. The Fed started
reducing interest rates in September 2007, after interbank
lending markets froze temporarily. In contrast, the ECB and most17
IT central banks kept rates steady until October 2008, after the
failure of Lehman Brothers caused panic in financial markets.
Inflation targeters that kept rates steady include the U.K.,
whose financial system experienced problems over 2007-08 that
were arguably just as bad or worse than those in the U.S. An open
question is whether the Fed’s discretionary policy regime was 
part of the reason for its quick reaction to the financial
crisis. 
III. PREVIOUS WORK ON INFLATION TARGETING
     A large literature estimates the effects of inflation
targeting, with varying results. Much of the variation is
explained by which countries are examined. Inflation targeting
has spread from advanced economies to emerging economies, such as
Brazil, South Africa, and the Czech Republic. Table 3 lists
emerging-economy inflation targeters. Most work on advanced
economies, although not all, confirms the findings of Section II:
the effects of IT are weak. In contrast, papers that examine
emerging economies report significant benefits of IT. Most
researchers find that IT reduces average inflation in emerging
economies, and some also find effects on output and inflation3 I include two papers with fewer than 20 citations: Lin and Ye (2009) and Gurkaynak
(2008). These papers are helpful for interpreting other papers by the same authors with more
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stability. Surveying the literature, Walsh (2009) concludes that
IT does not matter for advanced economies but does matter for
emerging economies.
     This conclusion makes sense, as pointed out by Goncalvez and
Salles (2008). Central banks in advanced economies are likely to
have higher levels of credibility and expertise than those in
emerging economies, and to face smaller shocks. These advantages
may allow policymakers to stabilize the economy without an
explicit nominal anchor, while emerging economies need the
discipline of IT.
     Here, I critically review past research on inflation
targeting. In choosing papers to examine, I have sought to
identify the most influential work in an objective way. To that
end, I searched Google Scholar in January 2010 for all papers
dated 2000 or later with “Inflation Targeting” or “Inflation
Targeter” in the title. Of those papers, I chose all that
satisfied two criteria: they contain empirical work comparing
countries with and without inflation targets, and they had at
least 20 citations. I ended up with 14 papers.3than 20 cites. I leave out one paper with more than 20 cites, Corbo et al. (2002). This paper
appears to be superceded by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), which has a common
coauthor and the same title. 
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     These papers address three broad topics: the effects of IT
on the means and variances of output and inflation; effects on  
the persistence of shocks to inflation; and effects on inflation
expectations. Here I give an overview of this work; Appendix 3
provides further details. Unfortunately, a variety of problems
casts doubt on the conclusions of most studies.
Means and Variances
     Many papers ask how IT affects the first two moments of
inflation and output. As discussed earlier, it is tricky to
answer this question because IT adoption is endogenous. Studies
can be categorized by how they address this endogeneity problem.
     Differences-in-differences: Some early papers measure the
effects of IT with a pure differences-in-differences approach:
they estimate equation (1) or do something similar.  This work
includes Cecchetti and Ehrman (2000), Hu (2003), and Neuman and
von Hagan (2002). These papers generally find that IT reduces the
mean and variance of inflation; they report mixed results about
the variance of output. 20
     These papers were natural first steps in studying the
effects of IT. However, subsequent work has established that
estimates of equation (1) are biased because initial conditions
affect IT adoption. Studies that ignore this problem do not
produce credible results.
     Controlling for Initial Conditions: As described above, Ball
and Sheridan (2005) address the endogeneity problem by estimating
equation (2), a diffs-in-diffs equation that controls for the
initial level of performance. They examine advanced economies
and, like the empirical work above, find no effects of IT except
a weak one on average inflation (a decrease of 0.6 percentage
points with a t-statistic of 1.6).
     Goncalvez and Salles estimate equation (2) for a sample of
36 emerging economies and find substantial effects of IT.
Switching to this policy reduces average inflation by 2.5
percentage points. It also reduces the standard deviation of
annual output growth by 1.4 percentage points. For the average IT
adopter, the standard deviation of output growth under IT is 2.2
percentage points; Goncalvez and Salles’s results imply that this
number would be 3.6 points without IT. The combination of these
results and Ball and Sheridan’s support the view that IT has21
stronger effects in emerging economies than in advanced
economies.
     Goncalvez and Salles’s results are important, but they raise
questions of interpretation and robustness. Five of the non-IT
countries in the study, including Argentina and Bulgaria, have
hard currency pegs during parts of the sample period. As
discussed in Section VI, hard pegs can increase output
volatility. It is not clear how Goncalvez and Salles’s results
would change if the non-IT group included only countries with
flexible policy regimes.
     One can also question Goncalvez and Salles’s dating of
regime changes and their treatment of years with very high
inflation. These issues are discussed in Appendix 3. More work is
needed to test the validity of Goncalvez and Salles’s
conclusions.  
     Instrumental Variables If inflation targeting is endogenous,
it might seem natural to estimate its effects by instrumental
variables. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) take this approach
with quarterly data for 21 advanced and 13 emerging economies. In
the equation they estimate, inflation depends on lagged inflation
and a dummy variable for IT. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel find no22
significant effect of IT for advanced economies, but a big effect
for emerging economies: in the long run, IT reduces inflation by
7.5 percentage points. This estimate is three times the effect
found by Goncalvez and Salles.
     Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel’s results are not credible,
however, because of the instrument they use for the IT dummy: 
the lagged IT dummy. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel motivate their
use of IV by arguing that the IT dummy is influenced by variables
that also affect inflation directly, such as central bank
independence and the fiscal surplus –- variables captured by the
error term in their equation. If these variables affect the IT
dummy, then they also affect the lagged IT dummy. For example,
the features of New Zealand that help explain why it targeted
inflation in the first quarter of 2000 also help explain why it
targeted inflation in the last quarter of 1999. Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel’s instrument is correlated with the error in their
equation, making it invalid. 
     Propensity Score Matching: A final approach to the
endogeneity problem is propensity score matching. This method is
relatively complex, but the idea is to compare the performance of
IT and non-IT countries that are similar along other dimensions. 4 Duecker and Fischer (2006) match inflation targeters with
similar non-targeters informally. Like Lin and Ye, they find no
effects of IT in advanced economies.
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     Two papers by Lin and Ye (2007, 2009) take this approach.
Consistent with other work, they find that IT matters in emerging
economies but not advanced economies. For emerging economies,
they find that IT reduces average inflation by 3%, not far from
Goncalvez and Salles’s estimate. They also find that IT reduces
inflation volatility.
     Vega and Winkelreid (2005) also use propensity score
matching. They find that IT reduces the level and volatility of
inflation in both advanced and emerging economies. In my view,
there are several reasons to doubt the results for advanced
economies. The issues are somewhat arcane, so I leave them for
Appendix 3.4
Inflation Persistence
     Advocates of inflation targeting, such as Bernanke et al
(1999), argue that this policy reduces inflation persistence:
shocks to inflation die out more quickly.  The Ball-Sheridan and
Mishkin-Schmidt-Hebbel papers introduced above both test for such
an effect. For advanced economies, Ball and Sheridan find that IT24
has no effect on persistence in the univariate inflation process.
For emerging economies, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel find that IT
reduces the persistence of inflation movements resulting from
oil-price and exchange-rate shocks. These results support the
distinction between advanced and emerging economies that runs
through the IT literature.
     Probably the best-known work on IT and inflation persistence
is Levin et al. (2004). This paper is unusual in reporting strong
effects of IT in advanced economies. Levin et al. estimate
quarterly AR processes for inflation and “core inflation” and
compute persistence measures such as the largest autoregressive
root. For the period 1994-2003, Levin et al. conclude that
persistence is “markedly lower” in five IT countries than in
seven non-IT countries.
     Once again, there are reasons to doubt the conclusion that
IT matters.  One is that the IT countries in the sample are
smaller and more open economies than the non-IT countries. This
difference, rather than the choice of policy regime, could
explain different inflation behavior in the two groups. Appendix
3 discusses this point and related questions about Levin et al.’s
results. 25
Inflation Expectations
     Four papers present evidence that IT affects either short
run or long run inflation expectations.
     Short Run Expectations: Johnson (2002) examines eleven
advanced economies that reduced inflation in the early 1990s.  He
compares countries that did and did not adopt inflation targets
near the start of disinflation.  Johnson measures expected
inflation with the one-year-ahead forecast from Consensus
Forecasts, and finds that this variable fell more quickly for
inflation targeters than for non-targeters.
     There are no obvious flaws in Johnson’s analysis, but it
raises a puzzle.  As Johnson points out, a standard Phillips
curve implies that a faster fall in expected inflation should
allow targeters to achieve greater disinflation for a given path
of output. In other words, the sacrifice ratio should fall.  Yet
other work finds that IT does not affect the sacrifice ratio, at
least in advanced economies (e.g. Bernanke et al. 1999). 
     Long Run Expectations Proponents of IT argue that this
regime anchors long run inflation expectations (e.g. Bernanke et
al; King, 2005). Once IT is established, expectations remain at
the target even if actual inflation deviates from it temporarily.26
This effect makes it easier for policymakers to stabilize the
economy. 
     Three papers present evidence for this effect. The first is
the Levin et al. paper introduced above. In addition to measuring
persistence in actual inflation, the paper examines professional
forecasters’ expectations of inflation from three to ten years in
the future. For each country in their sample, the authors
estimate an effect of past inflation on expected inflation.  The
estimates are close to zero for inflation targeters but
significant for non-targeters.
     Levin et al.’s regressions appear to uncover some difference
between targeters and non-targeters. Yet the specification and
results are odd. Levin et al. regress the change in expected
inflation from year t-1 to year t on the difference in actual
inflation between t and t-3 (although they do not write their
equation this way). One would expect the change in expectations
to depend more strongly on the current inflation change than the
three-year change. Yet Levin et al. find large effects of the
three-year change in non-IT countries (again, see Appendix 3 for
details).
     The other two papers on long-term expectations are Gurkaynak27
et al. (2006) and Gurkaynak et al. (2008). These papers estimate
the effects of news, including announcements of economic
statistics and policy interest rates, on expected inflation. They
measure expectations with daily data on interest rates for
nominal and indexed government bonds. Together, the two papers
find that news has significant effects on expectations in the
United States, a non-inflation-targeter, but not in three
targeters, Sweden, Canada, and Chile. For the U.K., a targeter,
they find effects before 1997, when the Bank of England became
independent, but not after.  Gurkaynek et al. (2006) conclude
that “a well-known and credible inflation target” helps anchor
expectations.
     These papers are among the more persuasive in the IT
literature. The worst I can say is that they examine only one
non-IT country, the United States, where bond markets may differ
from those of smaller countries in ways unrelated to inflation
targeting. Also, part of the U.S. data come from the first few
years after indexed bonds were created, when the market for these
bonds was thin. For those years, yield spreads may not be
accurate measures of expectations. Future research should extend
the Gurkaynak analysis to later time periods and more countries.5 As this chapter neared completion in early 2010, a crisis in Greece spurred controversy
about the euro. Greece found itself in the position of countries with hard pegs, which cannot use
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Summary
     Many papers find beneficial effects of IT in emerging
economies, but the evidence is not yet conclusive. For advanced
economies, most evidence is negative. However, IT may affect
long-term inflation expectations in bond markets.
IV. THE EURO
     How has the euro affected the countries that joined?  We saw
earlier that, for the Great Moderation period, euro adoption had
no detectable effects on the level or volatility of output
growth, inflation, or interest rates (Table 2). Starting in 2008,
the euro area experienced a deep recession along with the rest of
the world. It is not obvious that currency union was either
beneficial or harmful during this episode.  
     Yet the euro has not been irrelevant. Some of the effects
predicted when the currency was created have started to appear.
Here I review evidence for two widely-discussed effects: greater
economic integration, and costs of a “one size fits all” monetary
policy.
5 exchange rates as shock absorbers when capital flight occurs (see Section VI). The ultimate
effects on Greece and other euro countries are unclear, but they will likely  influence future
assessments of the costs and benefits of currency unions.
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Economic Integration
     Euro proponents argue that a common currency promotes trade
and capital flows within the euro area. These effects follow from
lower transaction costs, more transparent price comparisons, and
the elimination of any risk of speculative attacks. Greater
integration should increase competition and the efficiency of
resource allocation, raising economic growth (see, e.g.,
Papademos [2009]).
     Trade: Previous Research A large literature estimates the
deteminants of trade with “gravity equations,” in which trade
between two countries depends on their size, distance from each
other, income, and so on –- and whether the countries use a
common currency.  Using this approach, Rose (2000) famously
estimated that a currency union increases trade among its members
by 200%.  This finding was based on data for small currency
unions that predate the euro; some used it to predict the effects
of euro adoption.  
     In recent years, researchers have had enough data to30
estimate the actual effects of the euro.  They report effects
that are much smaller than those found by Rose, but non-
negligible.  A survey by Baldwin (2006) concludes that the euro
has raised trade among members by 5-10%.  A survey by Frankel
(2010) says 10-15%.
     One might think the effects of a currency union grow over
time as trade patterns adjust to the new regime.  But Frankel
finds that the effects stop growing after five years or so, based
on data for both the euro and other currency unions.
     Trade: New Evidence I supplement previous research with some
simple new evidence. If a common currency promotes trade within
the euro area, this trade should increase relative to trade
between euro countries and other parts of the world.  Figure 1
looks for this effect in the DOTS data on bilateral trade from
the IMF.  
     In the Figure, trade within the euro area is measured by all
exports from one euro country to another, as a percent of euro
area GDP.  Trade with another group of countries is measured by
exports from the euro area to the other countries plus imports
from the other countries, again as a percent of euro area GDP. 
All variables are normalized to 100 in 1998, the year before the31
euro was created.  
     In Figure 1, one group of non-euro countries has just one
member, the United Kingdom.  The U.K. is the European Union’s
most prominent non-adopter of the euro.  Another group of
countries includes 11 advanced economies, specifically non-euro
countries that were members of the OECD in 1985.  The final group
is all 183 non-euro countries in the DOTS data set.
     The Figure suggests that the euro has boosted trade among
euro countries.  Trade with other regions rose more rapidly than
intra-euro trade from 1993 through 1998.  But starting in 1999,
the first year of the common currency, intra-euro trade rose
relative to trade with the U.K. and other advanced economies.
This divergence accelerated after 2002. In 2008, intra-euro trade
was almost 40% higher than it was in 1998. In contrast, euro-OECD
trade rose less than 10% from 1998 to 2008, and euro-UK trade was
almost unchanged.
     These results suggest a larger impact of the euro on trade
than the 5-15% reported in previous work.  They also suggest,
contrary to Frankel, that the effects of the euro were still
growing ten years after the currency was created. A caveat is
that my analysis does not control for time-varying determinants32
of trade patterns, such as income levels and exchange-rate
volatility. 
     Notice that trade among euro countries has not risen more
than trade with all DOTS countries. From 1998 to 2008, the
changes in intra-euro trade and in trade with the rest of the
world are almost identical. This fact reflects rising trade with
emerging economies such as India and China, which have become
larger parts of the world economy. One way to interpret the
euro’s influence is that it has helped intra-euro trade keep pace
with trade between Europe and emerging markets.
     Capital Markets: Lane (2009) surveys the effects of the euro
on capital market integration and finds they are large. He
discusses three types of evidence. The first are estimates of the
euro’s effects on cross-border asset holdings, which are based on
gravity equations like those in the trade literature. Papers such
as Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008) find that the euro has
roughly doubled cross-border holdings of bonds within the
currency union. It has increased cross-border holdings of equity
by two thirds. Other studies find smaller but significant effects
on foreign direct investment and cross-border bank loans.
     The second type of evidence is convergence of interest6 Since Lane (2009) surveyed the evidence for interest-rate convergence, rates on
government bonds have diverged as a result of the Greek debt crisis of 2009-2010. However, this
development may be explained by default risk rather than decreased integration of capital
markets. The long-term effects of the Greek crisis on capital markets remain to be seen. 
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rates. Money market rates have been almost identical in different
euro countries, except at the height of the financial crisis.
Cross-country dispersion in long-term interest rates has also
fallen, and the remaining differences can be explained by risk
and liquidity.
6
     Finally, Lane presents scattered but intriguing evidence
that the integration of capital markets has contributed to
overall financial development. A striking fact is that the
quantity of bonds issued by euro-area corporations tripled
between 1998 and 2007. Papaioannou and Portes (2008) find that
joining the euro increases a country’s bank lending by 17% in the
long run. Using industry data, Dvorak finds that the euro has
increased physical investment, especially in countries with less-
developed financial systems.
Does One Size Fit All?
     When a country adopts the euro, it gives up independent
monetary policy.  It can no longer adjust interest rates to
offset country-specific shocks.  Critics of monetary union (e.g.34
Feldstein, 2009) suggest that the reduced scope for policy leads
to greater output volatility.    
     As discussed by Blanchard (2006, 2007), this problem may be
exacerbated by the behavior of national price levels.  When a
country experiences an economic boom, its inflation rate is
likely to exceed the euro average. Higher prices make the economy
less competitive; in effect, it experiences a real appreciation
of its currency.  The loss of competitiveness eventually reduces
output.
     In this scenario, the return to long-run equilibrium is a
painful process. To reverse the divergence of price levels, an
economy that has experienced high inflation needs to push
inflation below the euro average temporarily. This disinflation
may require a deep recession. Based on this reasoning, Blanchard
predicts “long rotating slumps” as national price levels diverge
and are brought back in line. He calls the euro a “suboptimal
currency area.” 
     Evidence on Output Fluctuations Is there evidence of these
effects?  Blanchard suggests that real appreciation has
contributed to recessions in Portugal and Italy. Yet the evidence
in Section II of this chapter suggests that, overall, the euro35
has not increased output volatility.
     We can examine this issue another way. Currency union means
that monetary policy cannot be tailored to the circumstances of
individual countries.  In a given year, some countries will
experience booms and recessions that could be smoothed out if the
countries had separate monetary policies.  If this phenomenon is
important, currency union should create greater dispersion in
output growth across countries.
     There is no evidence of this effect. Figure 2 shows the
standard deviation of output growth across 11 euro members (all
countries that adopted the currency by 2000 except Luxembourg).
If there is any trend in this series since 1998, it is down
rather than up.  
     Evidence on Price Levels On the other hand, there may be
reason to worry about larger output fluctuations in the future. 
The euro era has seen a significant divergence in price levels
across countries, causing changes in competitiveness that may
destabilize output.
     The dispersion in inflation rates across euro countries has
fallen sharply since monetary union.  In recent years, this
dispersion has been comparable to inflation dispersion across36
regions in the United States –- where economists do not worry
about rotating slumps caused by a common currency.  Mongelli and
Wyploz (2009) call this phenomenon “price convergence.” 
     However, as Lane (2006) points out, the serial correlation
of relative inflation rates is higher in European countries than
in U.S. regions. A possible explanation is that inflation
expectations depend on past inflation at the national level, even
in a currency union. In any event, higher serial correlation
means that inflation differences cumulate to larger price-level
differences in Europe than in the U.S. 
     Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this point.  Figure 3 compares
the 11 major euro economies to 27 metropolitan areas in the U.S. 
The Figure shows the standard deviation of inflation rates across
countries or metro areas and the standard deviation of price
levels.  All price levels are normalized to 100 in 1998, so the
standard deviation of price levels is zero in that year. The
Figure confirms that inflation differences within Europe have
fallen to U.S. levels.  At the same time, price levels are
diverging at a faster rate in Europe.
     Figure 4 compares four broad regions of the United States 
to the four largest euro economies. Here, price level dispersion37
in 2008 is more than three times as large in Europe as in the
U.S.
     Europe’s price-level dispersion may partly reflect changes
in equilibrium real exchange rates.  However, much of the
dispersion is likely due to demand-driven inflation differences. 
For the period 1999-2004, Lane reports a correlation of 0.62
between the cumulative change in a country’s price level and
cumulative output growth. Both of these variables are highest in
Ireland and lowest in Germany. Lane interprets the correlation
between price and output changes as a “medium run Phillips
curve.”
     As of 2008, the spreading out of European price levels was
continuing.  This fact suggests that countries are building up
real exchange rate misalignments that must eventually be
reversed. This process could involve the rotating slumps that
Blanchard predicts.    
V. THE ROLE OF MONETARY AGGREGATES 
     A generation ago, any discussion of monetary regimes would
emphasize targeting of a monetary aggregate.  Versions of this
policy, advocated by Milton Friedman in the 1960s, were practiced38
by the U.S. during the “monetarist experiment” of 1979-82 and by
Germany and Switzerland during the 1980s and 90s.  Today,
however, most central banks in advanced and emerging economies
pay little attention to monetary aggregates.  They believe that
instability in money demand makes the aggregates uninformative
about economic activity and inflation. Policymakers rarely
mention the behavior of money in explaining their interest-rate
decisions (see Bernanke, 2008).
     The major exception is the European Central Bank, which says 
that monetary aggregates play a significant role in its
policymaking.  Here I ask how the ECB’s attention to money has
affected policy decisions and economic outcomes.  The answer is
anti-climactic: the ECB’s attention to money does not matter. 
While policymakers discuss monetary aggregates extensively, these
variables have rarely if ever influenced their choices of
interest rates.
The Two Pillars  
     The primary goal of the ECB is price stability, defined as
inflation “below but close to 2%” (ECB, 2010).  The Governing
Council adjusts short-term interest rates to achieve this goal. 
The ECB says that “two pillars” underlie its choices of rates. 39
One is “economic analysis,” in which the ECB forecasts inflation
based on real activity and supply shocks.  This process is
similar to inflation forecasting at inflation-targeting central
banks.  The second pillar is “monetary analysis,” in which
policymakers examine measures of money and credit.  The primary
focus is the growth rate of the M3 aggregate (roughly equivalent
to M2 in the U.S.). The ECB compares M3 growth to a “reference
value” of 4.5%.  Policymakers say this comparison influences
their choices of interest rates; everything else equal, higher M3
growth may lead to tighter policy.  
     The ECB argues that its monetary analysis helps it achieve
price stability because money growth is a signal of inflation at
medium to long horizons.  Many outsiders criticize the ECB’s
logic and argue that it should switch to pure inflation
targeting.  The ECB volume edited by Beyer and Reichlen (2008)
presents both sides of this debate (see the explanations of ECB
policy by Trichet and Issing and the critiques by Woodford and
Uhlig).
     I examine the roles of the ECB’s two pillars over its
history.  I find that economic analysis and monetary analysis
usually produce the same prescriptions for policy.  On the rare40
occasions when the two analyses conflict, economic analysis
appears to determine policy.  Therefore, the ECB’s policy
decisions have always been close to those it would have made if
economic analysis were its only pillar.
Collinearity
     I base my conclusions largely on editorials in the ECB
Monthly Bulletin, which explain the interest-rate decisions of
the Governing Council.  A typical editorial summarizes the ECB’s
current economic analysis and what it suggests for the direction
of policy.  The editorial then “cross-checks” this prescription
with monetary analysis.  Usually the monetary analysis confirms
the economic analysis.
     As an example, consider the Monthly Bulletin of July 2008,
which explains a decision to raise interest rates by a quarter
point.  The summary of the ECB’s economic analysis concludes that
“risks to price stability at the policy-relevant medium horizon
remain clearly on the upside.”  This judgment reflects current
inflation above the 2% limit and fears about rising food and
energy prices. The economic analysis implies that a policy
tightening is warranted.
     The editorial goes on to say that “the monetary analysis41
confirms the prevailing upside risks to price stability at
medium-to-longer-term horizons.”  It notes that annual M3 growth
exceeds 10%. This number “overstates the underlying path of
monetary expansion, owing to the impact of the flat yield curve
and other temporary factors.”  Nonetheless, the monetary analysis
“confirms that the underlying rate of money and credit growth
remains strong.”  The monetary analysis points to the same need
for tightening as the economic analysis.
     ECB economists acknowledge that situations like July 2008
are typical.  At most policy meetings, the economic and monetary
analyses point to the same action. Fischer et al (2008) is
perhaps the ECB’s most detailed review of the role of money in
its policymaking.  That paper concludes “there is a high degree
of collinearity between the communication regarding the monetary
and economic analyses.”  This collinearity makes the role of
money “difficult to assess.”
Exceptions to Collinearity   
     The ECB’s economic and monetary analyses do not always point
in the same direction.  Fischer et al and Trichet (2008) cite two
episodes in which the two pillars produced conflicting signals. 
In my reading of the record, in one case policy followed the42
prescription of the economic analysis; in the other, the two
signals did not really differ by much.  Since Fischer et al and
Trichet wrote, there has been one clear case of conflicting
signals, and again the economic analysis prevailed. 
     2001-2003: This period is one of the episodes identified by
Fischer et al. and Trichet. It was a period of low output growth
when the ECB eased policy. Fischer et al report:
Between mid-2001 and mid-2003, the monetary analysis... pointed
to relatively balanced risks to price stability, whereas the
economic analysis saw risks on the downside.  Overall, the
successive cuts of interest rates of this period suggest that the
economic analysis played the decisive role in explaining monetary
policy decisions.
Fischer et al explain why policymakers disregarded their monetary
analysis. In 2001-03, M3 was growing rapidly, but this reflected
unusual temporary factors.  Savers were shifting to safe assets
in the wake of the global stock market decline and the September
11 terrorist attacks.  This shift did not necessarily indicate
inflationary pressures.
     Trichet (2008) interprets this episode differently than
Fischer et al.  He says “the underlying monetary expansion was
rather sustained” and “monetary analysis had a particularly
decisive influence” on policy.  In Trichet’s view, rapid money43
growth prevented the ECB from lowering interest rates more than
it did.  Yet the ECB eased aggressively: from May 2001 through
June 2003, it cut its interest-rate target seven times, taking it
from 4.75% to 2.0%. The June 2003 target was the lowest in the
ECB’s first decade. We do not know what would have happened over
2001-2003 if money growth were lower.  It seems dubious, however,
that the young ECB, eager to establish its credibility as an
inflation fighter, would have pushed interest rates much below
2%.
     December 2005: In this month the ECB raised its interest-
rate target from 2% to 2.25%; this increase was the first in a
series that reversed the easing of 2001-03. Both Fischer et al.
and Trichet say the ECB’s monetary and economic analyses gave
different signals in December 2005. They agree that monetary
analysis was decisive in this episode.
     Trichet gives this account:
In December 2005, when we first increased policy rates, many
commentators judged our move as premature against the background
of a seemingly fragile economic recovery.  In fact, at that time
the signals coming from the economic analysis were not yet so
clear and strong.  But the continued strong expansion of money
and credit through the course of 2005 gave an intensifying
indication of increasing risks to medium term price stability
which played a decisive role in our decision to start increasing
policy rates in late 2005.... Without our thorough monetary44
analysis, we probably would have been in danger of falling behind
the curve...
Fischer et al. contrast the “degree of uncertainty” in the
economic analysis to the “stark signal” provided by monetary
analysis.
     In my reading, the real-time policy record does not support
this interpretation.  It suggests a typical case of collinearity
rather than a decisive role for money.  In the Monthly Bulletin
of December 2005, the editorial says the decision to raise rates
reflected “risks to price stability identified in the economic
analysis and confirmed by cross-checking with the monetary
analysis.”  After that, the editorial devotes six paragraphs to
summarizing the economic analysis, concluding that “the main
scenario for price stability emerging from the economic analysis
remains subject to upside risks.”  Then a single paragraph makes
the point that “evidence pointing to increased upside risks to
price stability over the medium to longer term comes from the
monetary analysis.”  The editorial concludes by repeating that
the economic analysis was “confirmed by cross-checking” with the
monetary analysis.
     Fall 2008 Like many central banks, the ECB lowered interest45
rates rapidly during the financial crisis following the failure
of Lehman Brothers. At least in the early stages, this easing was
motivated entirely by economic analysis.  Monetary analysis did
not support an easing, but it was disregarded.
     The ECB first cut rates by half a percent on October 8, in
between policy meetings.  The press release explaining this
action includes only economic analysis.  It discusses the
influence of falling output growth and other non-monetary factors
on inflation.  The 12-month growth rate of M3 was 8.8%% for
August (the last month for which data were available on October
8). M3 growth far exceeded the reference value of 4.5%, but the
press release ignores this fact.
     At its November meeting, the Governing Council cut rates by
another half percent.  In the Monthly Bulletin, this decision is
explained by economic analysis: as the world economy slumped, “a
number of downside risks to economic activity have materialized.” 
The monetary analysis does not support a cut in interest rates. 
To the contrary, “taking the appropriate medium-term perspective,
monetary data up to September confirm that upside risks to price
stability are diminishing but that they have not disappeared
completely.”  The 12-month growth rate of M3 was 8.6% for46
September. If policymakers put a significant weight on monetary
analysis, it is unlikely they would have cut interest rates as
sharply as they did.
     
VI. HARD CURRENCY PEGS
     The final monetary regime that I examine is a hard peg to a
foreign currency.  Under this policy, as in a currency union, a
country gives up independent monetary policy.  There are two
basic versions of a hard peg: dollarization and a currency board. 
In the first, a country abolishes its national currency and uses
a foreign one.  In the second, the country maintains its currency
but seeks a permanently fixed exchange rate against a foreign
currency.  It pledges not to change the exchange rate, and it
maintains enough foreign-currency reserves to prevent a
speculative attack from forcing devaluation.
     Nine economies have adopted hard pegs since 1980 (eight
independent countries plus Hong Kong). Table 4 lists these
economies and when they began their pegs. The European countries
on the list pegged to the Deutschmark and switched to the euro
when it was created; the other countries pegged to the U.S.
dollar. The pegs are still in effect everywhere but Argentina,7 In categorizing countries as hard peggers, I generally follow the IMF (2008). The only
exception is Latvia, which the IMF counts as a “conventional fixed peg” – a softer policy than a
currency board. I count Latvia as a currency board because its central bank’s web site says, 
“The exchange rate policy of the Bank of Latvia is similar to that of a currency board, and the
monetary base is backed by gold and foreign currency reserves.”
               A number of countries have hard pegs that predate 1980.  Most are tiny (e.g. San
Marino and the Marshall Islands). The largest is Panama, which has used the U.S. dollar since
1903, when it ceded the Canal Zone to the United States. 
47
which created a currency board in 1991 and ended it in 2002.7
     The Argentina example shows that a hard peg is not
guaranteed to last forever. Even if a country has enough reserves
to maintain the peg, doing so may be costly enough that political
leaders choose to change course. Argentina’s case also suggests,
however, that extreme circumstances are needed to break a hard
peg. Argentina ended its currency board only after economic
distress produced riots and three changes of governments in two
months. As we will see, other countries have maintained their
pegs despite huge recessions. 
Why Hard Pegs?
     Countries have adopted hard pegs for two different reasons,
to reduce inflation and to increase integration with other
economies. 
     Inflation Control: In seven of the countries in Table 4 (all
cases except Hong Kong and El Salvador), the peg was adopted48
during a period of high inflation –- annual rates of three digits
or more. Policymakers sought to end inflation by tying their
currency to that of a low-inflation country, or by abolishing it.
     This approach to stopping inflation has always been
successful. As an example, Figure 5 shows what happened in
Bulgaria. The inflation rate was over 1000% when the country
introduced a currency board in 1997; a year later, inflation was
5%. In six of the high-inflation countries that adopted hard
pegs, inflation fell below 20% within three years; in the seventh
country, Estonia, it took five years. Once inflation was below
20%, it stayed there permanently, except in Argentina when its
currency board collapsed.   
     On the other hand, a hard peg is far from essential for
stopping inflation. Many countries, including most in Latin
America and Eastern Europe, experienced high inflation in the
1980s or 1990s. Almost all have eliminated this problem (in 2008,
Zimbabwe was the only country with inflation over 100%.)
Countries stopped inflation with policies less drastic than a
hard peg, such as a temporary peg or a monetary tightening under
flexible exchange rates.
      Therefore, the argument for a hard peg must be political49
rather than economic. Arguably, if some countries are left with
any discretion, they will not manage to reduce inflation.  A
conventional stabilization program will encounter opposition, and
policymakers will be replaced or forced to change course. A hard
peg is needed to prevent backsliding in countries with histories
of failed stabilizations, such as Argentina. (For more on this
point, see De la Torre et al. [2003], who compare Argentina’s
currency board to Hernan Cortes’s decision to burn his ships.) 
     Economic Integration: Hong Kong and El Salvador had moderate
inflation rates when they adopted hard pegs (about 10% in Hong
Kong and 3% in El Salvador). Their motivation was to eliminate
exchange-rate fluctuations and increase integration with foreign
economies. Each economy had special reasons to value exchange-
rate stability. Hong Kong has an unusually high level of foreign
trade: imports and exports both exceed 100% of GDP. El Salvador
dollarized because it has high levels of trade with the United
States and Panama, which uses the dollar. In addition, prices are
often quoted in dollars in trade throughout Central America.   
     While Hong Kong and El Salvador adopted hard pegs for
sensible reasons, it is difficult to isolate the effects on
economic integration. To my knowledge, no research has tried to50
quantify the effects of the two countries’ pegs on trade or
capital flows. 
The Costs of Capital Flight
     The primary disadvantage of a hard peg, like membership in a
currency union, is the inability to adjust monetary policy in
response to shocks. In the experience of hard peggers, one type
of shock has proved most problematic: capital flight. Countries
with hard pegs are emerging economies, which often experience
capital inflows followed by sudden stops. In many emerging
economies, the exchange rate serves as a “shock absorber”:
depreciation reduces the output losses following capital flight.
Lacking this shock absorber, hard peggers experience deeper
slumps.
     The crisis of the Argentine currency board is a classic
example. Capital flight started in the late 1990s as a result of
rising government debt and real appreciation; the latter occurred
because Argentine inflation exceeded U.S. inflation over the 90s
(see Hausmann and Velasco, 2002). The result was a severe
recession: cumulative output growth from 1999 through 2002 was -
29.5%, and the unemployment rate rose to 20%. As mentioned
before, the recession created enough political turmoil to break51
the hard peg.
     In that case, capital flight was specific to one country. At
other times, capital flight has hit a region of the world. Within
the region, some countries had hard pegs and others did not. As a
result, we have episodes that approach natural experiments: we
can compare output losses in peggers and neighboring non-peggers
hit by similar shocks.
     I examine three episodes: the “Tequila crisis” that followed
Mexico’s debt default in 1994; the East Asian financial crisis of
1997-98; and the world financial crisis that began in 2008. In
the last case, I focus on emerging markets in Central and Eastern
Europe, where capital flight was most severe. For each of the
three crises, I examine countries’ output changes in the worst
year of the crisis and the following year.   
     Table 5 presents the results. For the Tequila crisis, I
examine the six largest countries in Latin America. This group
includes one pegger, Argentina, which was in the middle of its
currency-board period. The hardest hit economy was Mexico, as one
would expect since the crisis started in Mexico. It is noteworthy
that the second-worst performer was Argentina. It was the only
country besides Mexico to experience a year of negative growth.  52
     For the East Asian crisis, I examine the four “Asian
tigers.” The one hard pegger, Hong Kong, was hardest-hit: it was
the only country with negative growth over two years. One symptom
of Hong Kong’s deep slump was deflation: its price level fell 15%
from 1998 to 2004.
     Finally, I examine seven European economies in 2009-2010
(using IMF output forecasts from Fall 2009). These seven are the
formerly Communist countries that now belong to the European
Union. They received capital inflows before 2008, but perceptions
of increased risk caused sudden stops (IMF, 2009).
    Four of the seven countries are hard peggers. As shown in
Table 5, these four have the largest forecasted output losses. 
For three of them, the Baltic countries, cumulative output growth
is less than -15%.
    In all three episodes of capital flight, the currencies of
the non-pegging countries in Table 5 depreciated. As in the
textbook story, the exchange rate served as a shock absorber.
Countries with rigid exchange rates suffered more.
Summary
     On balance, the economic performance of hard peggers has
been poor. They have reduced inflation, but so have countries53
without hard pegs. And capital flight has caused deep recessions
in six of the nine peggers. The only ones to escape so far are
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Bosnia. These countries are in regions
where capital flight was relatively mild in 2008 (Latin America
and the former Yugoslavia).
VII. CONCLUSION
     This chapter has reviewed the experiences of economies with
alternative monetary regimes.  The introduction lists the main
findings. Perhaps the clearest lesson is the risk of severe
recessions under hard exchange-rate pegs, which is illustrated
vividly by the experiences of Argentina and the Baltic countries.
One topic that deserves more research is inflation targeting in
emerging economies. The current literature suggests benefits, but
it is not conclusive.
     Most of the evidence in this chapter comes from the Great-
Moderation era that ended in 2007. In the coming years,
researchers should examine how different monetary regimes handled
the world financial crisis. This episode may reveal features of
regimes that were not apparent when economies were more tranquil.54
APPENDIX 1: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF REGIME SHIFTS
     This Appendix outlines the econometric justification for the
empirical work in Section II. I first consider the two-period,
two-regime case studied by Ball and Sheridan. I show that OLS
applied to equation (1) produces biased estimates of the effects
of regime shifts, but equation (2) produces unbiased estimates. I
then discuss generalizations to three regimes and three periods.
The Underlying Model
     Assume that Xit, a measure of economic performance in
country i and period t, is determined by
     (A1) Xit = bI*it + "i + (t + <it ,    t=1,2 , 
where I*it is a dummy that equals one if country i targets
inflation in period t, and the other terms on the right side are
country, time, and country-time effects that are independent of
each other. These effects capture all determinants of inflation
besides IT. I* is zero for all countries in period 1. We are
interested in estimating the coefficient b, which gives the
effect of IT on performance.
     Taking the difference in equation (A1) for t=2 and t=1
yields
     (A2) )Xi = a + bIi + <i2 - <i1 ,8 Equation (A3) is a linear probability model. I conjecture, but have not proven, that the
unbiasedness of my estimator extends to the general case of Ii=h(Xi1,0i).
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where )Xi is Xi2-Xi1, a=(2-(1, and Ii=I*i2-I*i1. Ii is a dummy that
equals one if country i adopts IT in period 2. Equation (A2) is
the same as equation (1) in the text with ,i=<i2-<i1.
     I assume that Ii depends on the initial level of inflation,
Xi1:
     (A3) Ii = u + dXi1 + 0i ,
where 0i captures other determinants of the decision to adopt IT.
I assume this error is independent of the three errors in
equation (A1).
8 
A Biased Estimator of b
     As discussed in the text, it seems natural to estimate
equation (1) by OLS. However, under my assumptions, the error
term ,i equals <i2-<i1. Substituting (A1) into (A3) shows that Ii
depends on <i1. Since both ,i and Ii depend on <i1, they are
correlated. This implies that OLS estimation of (1) produces a
biased estimate of b.
An Unbiased Estimator of b
     Ball and Sheridan run the regression 
     (A4)  )Xi = a + wIi + cXi1 + ,i .56
Notice that the coefficient on Ii is labeled w. Let the OLS
estimate of w be wO. We do not pre-judge the relationship between
w and the structural parameter b in equation (1). However, we can
show that E[wO] = b, so the Ball-Sheridan equation produces an
unbiased estimate of the parameter of interest. 
     To establish this result, we “partial out” the terms a and
cXi1 from the right side of (A4):
     (A5)  )Xi = wI’i + ,i ,
where I’i is the residual from regressing Ii on a constant and Xi.
Equation (A3) implies 
     (A6) I’i = 0i + (u-uO) + (d-dO)Xi1 ,
where uO and dO are OLS estimates of the coefficients in (A3).
The OLS estimate of w in equation (A5) is identical to wO, the
estimate from equation (A4). We need to show that the expected
value of this estimate is b.
     This result follows from algebra that I sketch. The OLS
estimate of w in (A5) is defined as [E(I’i )()Xi)]/[E(I’i )
2],
where sums are taken over i. If we use (A2) to substitute for 
for )Xi and break the result into three terms, we get
      (A7)   wO = b[E(I’i Ii)/E(I’i )
2]
                    + [E(I’i )(<i2-<i1)]/[E(I’i)2] 57
                    + a[E(I’i)]/[E(I’i)
2] .
In this expression, the third term is zero. 
     To find the expectations of the first two terms, I first
take expectations conditional on I’i. The conditional expectation
of the second term is zero because I’i is uncorrelated with the
<’s. This follows from the facts that (1) I’i is determined by 0i
and the 0’s for all observations, which determine u-uO and d-dO;
and (2) the 0’s are uncorrelated with the <’s. 
     Turning to the first term in (A7), note that E(I’i Ii) =
[E(I’i)
2]+[E(I’i)(Ii-I’i)] = [E(I’i)
2] (because the products of a
regression’s fitted values and residuals sum to zero).
Substituting this result into the first term in (A7) establishes
that this term equals b.
     Combining all these results, the expectation of wO
conditional on I’i is b. Trivially, taking expectations over I’i
establishes that the unconditional expectation, E[wO], is b.      
Three Time Periods
     In this paper’s empirical work, the data cover three time
periods rather than two. Here I sketch the generalization of the
Ball-Sheridan analysis to this case. For now, I continue to
assume there are only two policy regimes, IT and non-IT.58
     The underlying model is again given by equation (A1), but
with t=1,2,3. Differencing this equation yields
     (A8) )Xit = at + bIit + <it - <it-1 ,  t=2, 3 ,
where at=(t-(t-1 and Iit=I*it-I*it-1. Iit equals one if country i
switches from traditional policy to IT in period t.
     This model assumes that the policy regime, as measured by
the dummy variable I*, affects the level of performance X. It
follows that changes in regime, measured by I, affect the change
in performance )X.  The level of I* does not matter for )X. In
particular, if a country does not switch regimes between periods
2 and 3, it does not matter whether the country has traditional
policy in both periods or IT in both period. As discussed in the
text, this restriction is not valid if the adoption of IT has
different short-run and long-run effects. Therefore, one of the
robustness checks in my empirical work relaxes the restriction. I
allow different short-run and long-run effects of IT by
introducing a dummy that equals one in period t if a country is a
targeter in both t and t-1.
     With three time periods, one can pool data on )Xi3 and )Xi3 
to estimate b, the effect of IT. Once again, OLS estimates of
(A2) are biased but the bias can be eliminated by adding Xit-1 to59
the equation. One can show that the proper specification allows
both at, which captures international changes in performance, and
the coefficient on Xit-1 to differ across periods. The coefficient
on Xit-1 depends on the relative importance of permanent and
transitory shocks to X, which can change over time.
Three Regimes
     Finally, consider the case of three policy regimes-
–traditional, IT, and the euro–-as well as three periods. In this
case, the underlying model can be written as
    (A9) Xit = I*it + (c+d)E*it + "i + (t + <it ,    t=1,2 3,
where E*it=1 if country i uses the euro in period t, and once
again I*it=1 if the country is an inflation targeter. In this
specification, the parameter c gives the effect of IT relative to
a baseline of traditional policy, and d is the effect of the euro
relative to IT. The effect of the euro relative to traditional
policy is b+c.
     Differencing (A9) yields
   (A10) )Xit = at + c(I*it-I*it-1)+ (c+d)(E*it-E*it-1) + <it + <it-1    
               = at + cIit  + dEit + <it + <it-1 ,             
where again at=(t-(t-1 and the second line follows from the
definitions of Iit and Eit in the text. Once again, I add Xit-1 to60
the equation to eliminate bias in the coefficient estimates, and
allow at and the coefficient on Xit-1 to vary with t. The result is
equation (3), the main specification in my empirical work.        
APPENDIX 2: DETAILS OF EMPIRICAL WORK
     The empirical work in Section II is based on the countries
and sample periods in Table 1. In quarterly data, the dating of
IT adoption follows Ball and Sheridan. The period of traditional
policy ends in either the last quarter before IT or the quarter
before that; if IT is adopted in the middle of a quarter, the
quarter is not included in either the IT or pre-IT period.
     For all countries that adopted the euro, the euro period
begins in 1999:1 and the pre-euro period ends in 1998:4.
     I use annual data in studying output behavior. With annual
data, a year belongs to a regime period only if all four quarters
belong under the quarterly dating.
     The central empirical results are estimates of equation (3) 
for different measures of economic performance. Table 2 gives key
coefficients; Table A1 gives the full regression results. 
     Table A2 presents the robustness exercises discussed in the
text. Mostly, the qualitative results do not change. One result61
worth noting comes from Panel D of the table, where I estimate
short-run and long-run effects of inflation targeting. The short-
run effect on average inflation is significantly negative, but
the long-run effect (the sum of coefficients on I and R) is
insignificant with a positive point estimate. These results
suggest that the benefit of IT relative to traditional policy
declines over time.  
    (An odd result pops up in Panel B: a strong positive effect
of IT on the standard deviation of the interest rate. A possible
explanation is that only seven countries belong to the sample and
Japan is an outlier. Japan is a non-ITer with a large fall in
interest rate volatility due to the zero bound on rates.) 
APPENDIX 3: DETAILS ON PREVIOUS RESEARCH
     Here I give further details about some of the IT studies
reviewed in Section III:
     Goncalvez and Salles: This paper’s results are plausible,
but more work is needed to establish robustness. As discussed in
the text, we would like to know how things change if countries
with hard pegs are excluded from the sample. Other issues
include:62
     C Goncalvez and Salles do not say how they choose the non-IT
countries in their sample. It is not obvious which countries
should be categorized as emerging markets. Future work might use
some objective criterion, such as a range for income per capita.
     C There is one significant mistake in the data: Peru’s IT
adoption year is listed as 1994, while the correct year is 2003.
Goncalvez and Salles’s dating follows Fraga et al. (2003);
evidently there is a typo in that paper.
     C The dates of IT adoption range from 1991 to 2003 (when
Peru’s date is corrected). Thus the pre- and post-IT time periods
differ substantially across countries. Future research might
break the data into three periods, with splits in the early
1990s, when Israel and Chile adopted targets, and around 2000,
when other emerging economies adopted targets.
     C For each country, Goncalvez and Salles drop years with
inflation above 50%, while leaving all other years. It is not
clear how this truncation of the data affects the results.
Vega and Winkelreid
     This paper reports beneficial effects of IT in both advanced
and emerging economies. One reason to doubt this conclusion is
the contrary findings of Lin and Ye (2009). Another is a feature63
of Vega and Winkelreid’s specification: while they allow
different effects of IT in advanced and emerging economies, they
assume the equation determining IT adoption is the same. One
might think the variables in this equation, such as the fiscal
balance, have different effects on monetary policy in the two
groups.
     In addition, the paper’s results raise several related
puzzles:
    C The paper finds that “soft” inflation targeting reduces the
mean and standard deviation of inflation by more than “fully-
fledged” targeting, even though the latter is a bigger shift from
traditional policy. 
    C The ten advanced-economy inflation targeters have a total
of seven years of soft IT. Usually these countries move quickly
from traditional policy to fully-fledged targeting. Yet the paper
reports precise estimates of the effects of soft IT in advanced
economies. Many t-statistics are near 4.
    C For advanced economies, estimates of the effects of soft IT
on average inflation are around -3 percentage points. These
estimates imply that most countries with traditional policy would
have negative inflation rates if they adopted soft IT.64
Levin et al.: Inflation Persistence
     This paper estimates univariate time series models for five
IT countries and seven non-IT countries, plus the non-IT euro
area. Levin et al. report that, on average, inflation persistence
is lower in the IT countries: shocks to inflation die out more
quickly.
     There are several related reasons to doubt the paper’s
conclusion:
   C The results are sensitive to the choice of an inflation
variable. The persistence of core inflation (inflation excluding
food and energy) is lower for IT countries than for non-IT
countries. The persistence of total inflation, however, is
similar for the two groups.
   C The IT countries in the sample--Australia, Canada, Sweden,
New Zealand, and the UK--are on average smaller and more open
than the non-IT countries. In some of the analysis, the non-IT
group is four economies--the U.S., Japan, the euro area, and
Denmark–-of which three are the world’s largest and most closed.
Openness is likely to affect the behavior of inflation; for
example, fluctuations in exchange rates should cause larger
inflation movements in more open economies. Differences in9 Levin et al. report larger differences between IT and non-
IT countries when they exclude Denmark from the non-IT group. In
particular, there is some difference in the persistence of total
inflation as well as core inflation. However, excluding Denmark
magnifies the difference in openness between the two groups.
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openness rather than policy regimes could explain the different
inflation behavior in IT and non-IT countries.9
   C Levin et al. find that inflation persistence is lower in IT
countries, but innovations in inflation are larger than in non-IT
countries. In fact, innovations are so much larger that the
unconditional variance of inflation is higher in IT countries
despite lower persistence. There is no reason to expect this
result if the adoption of IT is the cause of low persistence.
Instead, the result suggests that the shocks hitting IT and non-
IT countries are different. In particular, it is consistent with
the hypothesis that external shocks have larger effects in IT
countries because they are more open. If these shocks cause large
transitory movements in inflation, they can explain both low
persistence and a high variance of inflation.   
Levin et al.: Expectations
     The Levin et al. paper also estimates the effects of
inflation on expected inflation, as measured by professional66
forecasts. For a given country, they estimate
      (A8)   )B
q
t = 8 + $)B
-
t + ,t ,
where B
q
t is the expectation in year t of inflation in year t+q
and B
-
t is a three-year moving average of inflation: B
-
t = (1/3)(Bt
+ Bt-1 + Bt-2). Equation (A8) can be rewritten as
      (A9) Bq
t -Bq
t-1 = ($/3)(Bt-Bt-3) .
That is, Levin et al. estimate the effect of a three-year change
in inflation on a one-year change in expectations. The rationale
for this specification is unclear.
     For non-IT countries and q between 3 and 10, the paper
reports estimates of $ in the neighborhood of 0.25. These
estimates imply that a one point change in (Bt-Bt-3) causes a 0.75




t-1 , a surprisingly large effect.67
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1997:2Country Period 1 Regime Period 2 Regime Period 3 Regime
Australia 1985:1-1994:2 T 1994:4-1999:1 I 1999:2-2007:2 I
Austria 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Belgium 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Canada 1985:1-1991:4 T 1992:1-1999:1 I 1999:2-2007:2 I
Denmark 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1999:1 T 1999:2-2007:2 T
Finland 1985:1-1993:4 T 1994:1-1998:4 I 1999:1-2007:2 E
France 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Germany 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Ireland 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Italy 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Japan 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1999:1 T 1999:2-2007:2 T
Netherlands 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
New Zealand 1985:1-1990:1 T 1990:3-1999:1 I 1999:2-2007:2 I
Norway 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-2000:4 T 2001:1-2007:2 I
Portugal 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1998:4 T 1999:1-2007:2 E
Spain 1985:1-1995:1 T 1995:2-1998:4 I 1999:1-2007:2 E
Sweden 1985:1-1994:4 T 1995:1-1999:1 I 1999:2-2007:2 I
Switzerland 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1999:4 T 2000:1-2007:2 I
United Kingdom 1985:1-1992:3 T 1993:1-1999:1 I 1999:2-2007:2 I
United States 1985:1-1993:2 T 1993:3-1999:1 T 1999:2-2007:2 T
Table 1
Policy Regimes
T = Traditional, I = Inflation Targeting, E = EuroInflation Output growth Interest rate Inflation Output growth Interest rate
-0.65 0.14 0.46 0.02 0.21 0.26
(0.25) (0.49) (0.27) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13)
0.36 -0.27 -0.75 -0.42 0.23 -0.09
(0.34) (0.65) (0.37) (0.30) (0.23) (0.18)
-0.29 -0.13 -0.29 -0.41 0.44 0.17
(0.33) (0.60) (0.34) (0.29) (0.22) (0.17)
Table 2
Effects of Inflation Targeting and Euro Adoption
Mean Standard Deviation
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* Adoption dates for Peru and Indonesia come from central bank websites; all other adoption dates 
come from Goncalvez and Salles (2008)
Emerging Economy Inflation Targeters
Table 3Country Adoption Date Type of Peg
Argentina* April 1991 Currency Board
Bosnia and Herzegovina  August 1997 Currency Board
Bulgaria July 1997 Currency Board
Ecuador January 2000 Dollarization
El Salvador January 2001 Dollarization
Estonia June 1992 Currency Board
Hong Kong October 1983 Currency Board
Latvia June 1993 Currency Board
Lithuania April 1994 Currency Board
* Peg collapsed in 2002
Table 4
Hard Pegs Adopted Since 1980Tequila Crisis
Country 1995 1996 Total
Mexico -6.167 5.153 -1.014
Argentina -2.845 5.527 2.681
Venezuela 3.952 -0.198 3.754
Brazil 4.220 2.150 6.370
Colombia 5.202 2.056 7.258
Peru 8.610 2.518 11.128
East Asian Crisis
Country 1998 1999 Total
Hong Kong -6.026 2.556 -3.471
South Korea -6.854 9.486 2.632
Singapore -1.377 7.202 5.826
Taiwan 4.548 5.748 10.296
Eemerging Markets in World Crisis
Country 2009 2010 Total
Lithuania -18.500 -4.000 -22.501
Latvia -18.003 -3.971 -21.974
Estonia -14.016 -2.573 -16.589
Bulgaria -6.500 -2.500 -9.000
Romania -8.456 0.496 -7.960
Hungary -6.730 -0.876 -7.606
Poland 0.975 2.189 3.164
Countries with hard pegs are in bold
Table 5
Hard Pegs and Capital Flight
Output Growth (% points)
Output Growth (% points)












Std Dev of 
Interest rate
0.77 2.70 0.71 0.68 0.39 0.47
(0.38) (0.48) (0.69) (0.29) (0.83) (0.22)
-0.37 1.55 -1.73 -0.37 -3.10 -0.12
(0.49) (0.58) (1.16) (0.41) (0.98) (0.29)
-0.65 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.46 0.26
(0.25) (0.23) (0.49) (0.18) (0.27) (0.13)
0.36 -0.42 -0.27 0.23 -0.75 -0.09
(0.34) (0.30) (0.65) (0.23) (0.37) (0.18)
-0.80 -0.83 -0.73 -0.98 -0.71 -0.45
(0.06) (0.10) (0.33) (0.15) (0.05) (0.12)
-0.17 -1.29 -0.37 -0.74 -0.37 -0.93
(0.20) (0.25) (0.19) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14)
Table A1









, 1 i t t X D −
( )
3
, 1 i t t X D −Inflation Output growth Interest rate Inflation Output growth Interest rate
-0.66 0.16 0.47 -0.04 0.23 0.27
(0.26) (0.51) (0.27) (0.23) (0.18) (0.14)
0.33 -0.38 -0.77 -0.47 0.25 -0.07
(0.36) (0.67) (0.39) (0.31) (0.24) (0.19)
-0.33 -0.22 -0.30 -0.51 0.48 0.20
(0.35) (0.64) (0.36) (0.30) (0.23) (0.17)
Inflation Output growth Interest rate Inflation Output growth Interest rate
-0.53 -0.01 0.65 0.50 0.36 0.41
(0.46) (0.67) (0.42) (0.42) (0.30) (0.13)
Inflation Output growth Interest rate Inflation Output growth Interest rate
Table A2
Effects of IT and the Euro: robustness checks
Mean Standard Deviation
B: EMS countries dropped from sample
Mean Standard Deviation
C: Same time periods for all countries
A: Denmark dropped from sample
Mean Standard Deviation







Coefficient on  it E
Coefficient on  it I
Coefficient on  it I
Coefficient on  it I
Coefficient on  it I
Coefficient on  it E
Coefficient on  it E
Coefficient on  it R






Inflation Output growth Interest rate Inflation Output growth Interest rate
-0.42 0.13 0.57 -0.04 0.04 0.20
(0.25) (0.49) (0.27) (0.22) (0.15) (0.17)
0.27 -0.28 -0.82 -0.33 0.22 -0.05
(0.36) (0.64) (0.38) (0.28) (0.20) (0.25)
-0.14 -0.15 -0.25 -0.37 0.25 0.14
(0.33) (0.60) (0.35) (0.27) (0.18) (0.22)
Inflation Output growth Interest rate Inflation Output growth Interest rate
-0.55 0.26 0.49 0.02 0.17 0.25
(0.25) (0.50) (0.27) (0.24) (0.18) (0.13)
Coefficient on R 0.74 0.82 0.51 0.03 -0.24 -0.09
(0.41) (0.83) (0.57) (0.43) (0.30) (0.24)
0.68 0.08 -0.46 -0.41 0.13 -0.14
(0.37) (0.74) (0.49) (0.35) (0.26) (0.23)
0.19 1.08 1.00 0.05 -0.07 0.16
(0.53) (1.06) (0.66) (0.54) (0.39) (0.29)
0.13 0.34 0.03 -0.39 0.30 0.12
(0.39) (0.76) (0.49) (0.37) (0.28) (0.22)
         equals 1 if country i targeted inflation in periods t-1 and t
D: Short run and long run effects of IT
Mean Standard Deviation













Coefficient on  it I
Coefficient on  it I
Coefficient on  it E
Coefficient on  it E
Coefficient on  it R
Sum of   and 
 coefficients 
it
it
I
R